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OLIGOPOLISTIC MANIPULATION OF SPOT MARKETS
AND THE TIMING OF FUTURES MARKET SPECULATION
* -k kLouis Phlips and Ronald M. Harstad
Abstract
We consider the impact upon activity in a futures market for 
a natural resource of an oligopolistic market structure in the 
production of the resource for supply to the spot market. In cur 
model, a futures market is open twice before a (single) maturity 
date, which coincides with the third period of spot market 
activity. Duopoly producers manipulate spot market prices at 
maturity so as to influence the value at maturity of futures 
contracts they hold (or have sold).
Futures market activity results from differences in opinion 
about the underlying demand for the resource, in a game of 
inconsistent incomplete information. Given the inconsistent 
beliefs, a rational speculator predicts the extent of manipulation 
by producers.
While the speculator has the option of closing out his 
futures position prior to maturity, and thereby not exposing 
himself to manipulation, in subgame-perfect equilibrium he chooses 
to hold open positions until maturity. Whenever players are not 
too risk-averse (relative to differences in beliefs), all futures 
trading occurs the first time the futures market is open.
Net short positions at maturity are unaffected by the timing 
of trading, and are Pareto-efficient, due to using take-it-or- 
leave-it contracts. Multiple prices of futures contracts coexist 
simultaneously in subgame-perfect equilibrium. Typically, some 
player simultaneously signs two futures contracts at different 
prices, not necessarily buying on one and selling on the other.
**
* European University Institute, Florence, Italy 






















































































































































































In the conventional approach to modeling futures markets ‘ ■
basic commodities, a central prediction is empirically unterab.e 
and key strategic questions relating to exercise of market powe. 
cannot readily be addressed. If traders have rational expectations 
(or more generally, rationally update beliefs drawn from 
consistent priors) contract terms which both parties to a futures 
trade would strictly prefer (to not trading) cannot exist, given 
cognizance of the other party's willingness to trade (Kreps 
(1977), Milgrom and Stokey (1982)). A prediction of a zero 
aggregate volume of speculative activity, in response to the 
slightest degree of risk aversion or transaction costs, is both 
inescapable and readily invalidated. Hedging motives can explain 
only a small fraction of the huge volume of -radir.g on commodity 
futures markets, and cannot explain the prer.rnce of many of tne 
traders.
A central purpose of the alternative model we investigate 
here is to support a prediction that both parties to a speculative 
transaction may be behaving rationally. The model shows that 
abandoning rational expectations need not imply abandoning
rational behavior: we posit that traders update their priors
rationally in response to new market information, but not in 
response to the inconsistent priors of other traders. In fact, we 
simplify by eliminating all private information, basing gains from 
trade solely upon what Varian (1989) calls "diffeteuces in 
opinion", thus creating a game of inconsistent incomplete
information (Selten (1982)].
Market power arises in futures markets not through barriers 
to trading, but indirectly, through producers' influence on the 
spot market price of the underlying basic commodity (Anderson 
(1990)). When futures traders are conventionally modeled as price- 
takers, producers' influence and the resulting interaction between 
spot and futures prices gets buried. We illustrate how these 
issues come naturally forward in a simple model of a Cournor 




























































































Oligopoly producers who are active in futures trading have 
an incentive to alter the time path of extraction so as to enhance 
the profitability of their futures positions. The common 
conjecture that speculators respond to this manipulation by 
closing out their futures positions prior to maturity simply does 
not hold up in equilibrium. We demonstrate this in the simplest 
possible model: three periods of spot market activity, the last 
the sole maturity date of take-it-or-leave-it futures contracts 
traded in the first two periods. A single speculator is added to 
the two producers. The findings of a rush to trade, oligopolistic 
manipulation at maturity, and yet open positions at maturity, 
clearly do not depend upon the expositional limitations to two 
producers, one speculator, two futures market periods, or take-it- 
or-leave-it contracts.
Section 1 describes the game. Section 2 derives its subgane 
equilibrium in t=2, while Section 4 does the same for t=l. Section 
3 discusses the updating of beliefs. The resulting time path of 
prices and other qualitative characteristics of subgame-perfect 
equilibrium outcomes are discussed in Section 5. We conclude with 
a rough sketch of inferences for situations with futures trading 
for several sequential maturity dates.
1. The game
There are three players, a speculator S and two producers 
A and B, of an exhaustible resource. The latter have known
initial stocks saQ and s^g. Each producer faces the
intertemporal constraint that the initial stock has to be depleted 
in period 3, the maturity date of the futures contracts 
considered, or
aO = qal + qa2 + qa3




























































































There are indeed three periods during which spot transactions take 
place. Current extraction rates (or current shipments, if stocks 
are available for shipment) are represented by q. (i=a,b; t=l, 
2,3) and equal to current consumption, so that there are no
stocks on the demand side.1 Each period exhibits the
instantaneous inverse market demand curve
Pt(qat + =
“t 1 ,
B B qat + qbt} t = 1, 2, 3 (2)
with 8>0.2 The underlying strength of market demand is
represented by a>0, which is random. In each spot market,
u)t=a+Yt is observed. The yt are independent of each other and 
have mean zero. The three players have inconsistent prior 
expectations of a, which will form the basis for futures 
trading. These priors are assumed to be common knowledge.
1. In Sections 2.1 and 4.1, we discuss opportunities for 
producers to manipulate extraction, and thus the value of 
futures contracts. If the model were complicated to allow 
consumers to hold stocks across spot markets, then far from 
undercutting manipulation, this complication would actually 
reduce producers' costs of manipulation, by allowing a 
smaller change in extraction to have the same effect on spot 
prices.
2. Prices are present prices, net of extraction and transport 
costs. The constant price path p defined below would 
correspond to a current (real) price path rising at a 
constant rate of interest. Variable interest rates would 
obscure the equilibrium timing pattern explored here.
3. A host of complications arise if the fact of inconsistent 
priors is common knowledge, but the priors themselves are 
private information. Some complications have yet to be 
considered in the literature on signaling games and 
refinements (van Damme (1989) and references cited there), 





























































































During the first two periods, there is futures trading on an 
"open outcry" futures market for take-it-or-leave-it contracts. In 
the third period, open futures positions are closed out at the 
spot price Pj.
The rules of the game are then as follows:
Step 1: Nature chooses a commitment order, which is a permutation
of the order (A, B, S), each drawn with equal probability.
Step 2: The futures market opens. The players simultaneously make
irrevocable announcements, each announcing an offer to sell and/or 
an offer to buy. Each offer is a take-it-or-leave-it price, 
quantity pair.
Step 3: The player designated first in the commitment order
irrevocably accepts or rejects each offer made by another player.
Step 4: The player designated second in the commitment order
irrevocably accepts or rejects each offer made by another player 
and not yet accepted.
Step 5: The player designated third in the commitment order
irrevocably accepts or rejects each offer made by another player 
and not yet accepted. The futures market closes.
Step S: The producers simultaneously determine their t=l
extraction plans.
Step 7: The sum 01=0+1^ is revealed as a result of the
transactions that occurred in the spot market.
Step 8: The futures market reopens. The players simultaneously
make irrevocable announcements of buy and sell orders, as in step
2.
Step 9: The player designated first in the commitment order




























































































Step 10: The player designated second in the commitment order
irrevocably accepts or rejects each offer not yet accepted.
Step 11: The player designated third in the commitment order
irrevocably accepts or rejects each offer not yet accepted. The4futures market closes.
4. Keeping the same commitment order each time the futures 
market is open allows us to focus questions of the timing of 
futures contracting on issues of beliefs, risk aversion and 
spot market manipulation.
If a different commitment order were used in the t=l futures 
market, a player i who could dictate terms to player j 
by waiting until t=2 to trade will refuse to trade on j's 
terms in t=l. When risk aversion is sufficiently slight, j 
may be able to attain for himself the incremental gains from 
trading in t=l over t=2 by offering an efficient contract 
giving i precisely the amount of gains from trade 
available by waiting until t=2. Thus, the calculation of 
these gains in section 4.2 is relevant to this elaboration 
as well.
It would add both realism and substantial complexity to 
require that announcements be made in steps 2 and 8 before 
the relevant commitment order is known (cf. Harstad and 
Phlips (1990)). With that requirement, trade in t=l would be 
artificially influenced by the probability of being able to 
extract all the gains from trade in t=2. As the net short 
positions we derive would clearly be unaffected by such 
alterations, we deem the added complexity unwarranted.
In another vein, the whole notion of a commitment order may 
be viewed as an overly stark focus on trading during the 
final few seconds before the futures market closes. We have 
not found a more palatable alternative. Imposing a 
bargaining solution, directly or by applying an equilibrium 




























































































Step 12: The producers determine, simultaneously, their t=2
extraction plans (and, implicitly, their t=3 extraction plans 
because of the intertemporal constraint on their stocks). The game 
ends.
Step 13: The spot price p^ is revealed.
We now proceed to solving the game backwards.
2. Subqame-perfect equilibrium in t=2
2.1. The extraction subqame in t = 2
In t=2, the objective functions for i=A,B to be 
with respect to q^2 and <5̂ 3, subject to constraint
^ 12^ 2^1 2  + CJ j 2 ) + (C* i 3  “  V  P 3 ( ^ i 3  + ^  '
where N. is player i's net short position on





(Footnote continued from previous page)
selection argument to the plethora of equilibria resulting 
from simultaneous contract acceptance, is an unwise choice. 
Once bargaining over the gains from trade is introduced, the 
constraint keeping such bargaining from spilling over into 
extraction market cartelization becomes untenable. Any 
spillover loses analytic separability and with it all 
sensible discussion of timing and manipulation.
5. Full objective functions are certainly equivalent levels of 
profit from activities in both extraction and futures 
markets. Equation (3) omits terms that do not vary with q^2 





























































































Equilibrium behavior in the t=2 extraction market (or step 
12 of the game) is obtained by a standard Cournot simultaneous 
maximization exercise, which yields:
*a2
sa0 - «al . Nb Na 
2 6 " 3
sb0 - qbl , Na Nb 
qb2 2 6 3
This implies
N, N b , a
4a3
sb0 - qbl Na , Nb 
qb3 2 6 3
(4a)
:4b)
If producer A has taken a net short position (Na>0) on the 
futures market, then A pumps less in period 2 and more in period 
3 than in the absence of the futures market. If producer B also 
has a net short position, this counteracts the reduction in A's 
extraction rate in period 2 and the incr, ase in period 3. The 
counteraction is less pronounced, however, so that the industry's 
extraction path is affected.
gives
Substitution of qa2 and q. 2 into the price equation
P2 = p “ 9(sa0 + sb0 ‘ 3(qal+qbl> - Na - Nb) (5a
p3 = p ~ 9 ̂ sa0 + sb0 " 3(qal+qbl> + Na + (5b
where p=o/B-(sao+sbCp/39 and 8=1/6B>0.
2.2. The futures market in t=2
In t=2, the futures market reopens. (We are at step 8 of the 




























































































incorporate the extraction rates found in (4) and the spot prices
and p^ in the certainty equivalent levels of profit
W. = E(u.) -i ' l ' 1 ^ i 2 +<3i3-Ni)28
K.
E U  ) - -Ì- 
282
(s.--q..-N.) ' lO ^ll l•
where
ïïi = <3i2P2<^i2+c3j2) + ^i3-NiJ ^3 (cîa3+% 3  > + Pabfab + PaSfas
and
Ws = (P3 * Pas> fas + <P3 ~ Pbs’ fbs '
the speculator being risk-neutral while the duopolists are risk-
averse.^ The futures position f , , f and f, are net totalab as bs
positions for each contracting pair across t=l and t=2 trades. The 
futures prices p^» Pas and PjjS are average prices over the 
t=l and t=2 trades. Positions are indicated by sign: f^^O
indicates that A sold futures to B ("A went short"), and 
similarly fjJs would be negative if, across t=l and t = 2, B 
bought more futures contracts from S than he sold to S. Thus,
£sb £bs ( the alphabe tized order for subscripts is used
throughout), so Na= f . +f ab ns, V f. -f bs ao 2 N =5 -f -f, . as bs We obtain
W = a Pa(saO - q . ) + ^al; Va (6a)
Wb = p j sbo - ^bu1 + vb (6b)
w = s (Ps Pas^ fas + ^ s ‘Pbs ) fbs " S(£as+fbs)2 (6c)
where
Va = (Pab~Pa )fab^Pas-Pa as+!^as + fbs]
Ka 2
2 g2(sa0 ^al £ab £as^
The producers must be risk-averse since the sum of the pay­





























































































Vb = ^b-Pab)fab+(Pbs-P^fbs+!(Eas+fbs52 " “ (sb0^bl + fab-fb s ^ 'z p
Note that represents i's expectation of p after 
observing t=l demand. Similarly pg denotes S's expectation of 
p. Beliefs are thus expressed as expectations about p rather 
than a.
With full knowledge of equations (6) and the expectations 
appearing in these, players now go through steps 8 to 11 of the 
game. Given the announcements of the two ether players, each 
player announces a contract which he considers to be acceptable to 
a particular other player, because it would give the latter at 
least a minimum acceptable profit.7 Once it is clear to all which 
contracts will be rejected, each player wishes to gain as much as 
possible in an acceptable contract. Thus, the f ^  to announce 
result from simultaneous solution of max (W^+W^), max (Wa+Ws) 
and max (w.^+W^. Manipulating the first-order conditions in 







(3Kb< PS'pa >+49 < Pb'pa >+ < °-°b > < saO"^al > "°b( sb0_c2bl > ) 
(3Ka (Ps'Pb)_48(Pb'Pii) + (o"ca )(sb0_cJbl)_oa(sa0"<Ial)) 




where N =-f -f, , o,=46K., a=c+cr, + 3K K, ands as bs i i a b  a b
E.(a) Sa0 CJa1+Shn
Pi = T
l bO 4bi 
2B
We simplify presentation by assuming that a player who is 
indifferent between accepting and rejecting a contract 
always accepts. This simplification is rather harmless, in 
that an appeal to a smallest money unit would justify the 
conclusions reached with only notational complications. All 
financial exchanges have smallest money units, which serve 
the purpose of identifying a smallest feasible increment 




























































































The first two terms inside the brackets are the speculative 
component of each net position. It is based on differences in 
beliefs, and independent of stocks. A natural comparative static 
result: greater divergences in beliefs lead to larger speculative 
positions. The remaining terms represent the hedging component. 
They relate the futures positions to the available stocks of 
resources, and are independent of differences in beliefs. Note 
that futures prices do not appear in equations (7): contract 
curves in futures are vertical.
While the net short positions are uniquely determined by the 
requirements of subgame-perfect equilibrium, the prices at which 
individual futures contracts are signed are not uniquely 
determined. However, the prices accepted can be described by a set 
of inequalities, derived from the simple idea that the player who 
accepts a particular offer will do so if it provides a nonnegative 
contribution to profit. For example, A accepts the offer f
and the associated price pab if V -V a a lfab=°
>0. Le
capitalized subscripts indicate players accepting . Then
pAb ? pa Ka^sa0 ^al 'as
f , ab i 
2 J as f . < ao 0 (8a)
paB 1 pb Kb(sb0-qbi-fbs+
f , ab -,
2 as f . < ab 0 (8b)
Ì
A |r-» fas -, f ? n (8c)pAs pa a^aO ^al ab 2 ‘ 'as u
paS i ps - 0(Eas-2fbs) as f < as 0 (8d)
PBs Ì pb ' Kb(sbO-%l + fab"
Cbs -v 
2 > as fbs ? 0 ( 8e )
pbS 1 ps - e(f, +2f ) ds asJ as fbs 5 0 . ( 8 f )
The direction of inequalities is that a seller prefers a higher, 
and a buyer a lower, price.
Of course, a player also has the option of foregoing futures 




























































































additional profit must be possible given the positions taken in 
the t=l futures market. Equilibrium must therefore satisfy
~ A l ~ ~ A 1
^as + 3^as + fbs^ 2^sa0 qal Na^Va » (Pab‘paî fab+^Pas Pa^ (9a)
Vb » (Pb-Pab^ fab+^bs-Pbî fbs+3^fas+fbs^ 2^sbO-qbl-Nb^ (9b)
Ws > (PS pas^ fas+(Ps"Pbs^ ^bs - 9^ s ) 2 (9c)
where ~'s indicate variables evaluated as of the close of the 
t=l futures market. It thus appears that gains in period 1 cannot 
be removed. This may prevent going all the way to the end of a 
contract curve.
3. Anticipations of updating of beliefs after t-1 spot market
We now move to step 7, at which o^a+y^ is revealed. To get
notation in hand, let prior beliefs be distributed as normals with
means and standard deviations (a0,£), (a?,5) and (a0,5) anda d s q
with likelihood functions proportional to normals (a +y.,1), 
0 0 8 a t(a^+Y^fl) and (a +y^, !)• Then the posteriors are normal with
mean
°<r'2 4. 0 _2+ a) ai + Ç a)
_ 2 2 
1 + € 1 + ç
(i = a, b, s)
and standard deviation
_J:___ = _ £ ____ .
_2  2 
1 + Ç 1 + 5
Our key interest in step 7, however, is in how it relates to 
a player's decision whether to contract in the futures market




























































































before or after the information from the first spot market is 
revealed. Before u=a+y1 is revealed, each player believes in his
own beliefs and expects the other players to have to update. So
0 0 player i with prior expects to update to E^(a^)=a^, that




that is, adjusting their beliefs toward his. In other words, the 
other players are expected to update a? on average to E^(a_.). 
It is on the basis of these expectations as to how beliefs will 
change that players evaluate the relative profitability of reach­
ing agreements in the t=l futures market (discussed below in Sec­
tion 4.2). After all, whenever differences in beliefs are based 
upon fundamental differences in opinion, there is also (naturally) 
a difference in opinion as to who can be expected to be forced to 
revise his belief in the presence of new information.
4. Subgame-perfect equilibrium in t=l
4.1. The extraction subqame in t=l
It will be shown below that, if futures contracts are signed 
between each pair of players in t=l, then no activity will occur 
in the t=2 futures market because net positions extract all gains 
from trade. In this case extraction policy in step 5 is straight­
forward, as in equations (11) below. However, if some futures con­
tracts remain to be signed during t=2, then player i=A,B who ex­
pects to still be active in t=2 futures has the possibility to al­
ter in hopes of influencing the t=2 spot market. This pos­
sibility arises because qi;L changes the amount of hedgeable 




























































































in the acceptable price equations (8). We claim that in subgame- 
perfect equilibrium, player i will not alter q ^  for these 
purposes. The argument proceeds in four steps.
First, if q ^  is set as in (11) below (which is the "unal­
tered" benchmark), then, given unaltered behavior by the other 
producer, p1=p2> So any altering by producer i will shift ex­
traction from a higher-priced to a lower-priced spot market. Thus, 
it strictly decreases spot market profits (in proportion to 
(4qu )2 if Aq ^  is the alteration), and will only be done if 
the added futures market profit exceeds the loss in spot market 
revenues.
Second, consider the t=2 futures market. Equations (7) for 
net positions separate into speculative and hedging components, as 
do the acceptable price equations (8). Speculative components are 
unaffected by Aq^, so aRy futures market profit from Aq^ re­
sults in the hedging components and is independent of1 beliefs and 
belief updatings.
Third, if a contract between i and j is anticipated in 
t=2 and it is anticipated that j will dictate terms to i, 
which is determinable, then i expects to gain just a minimum 
acceptable payoff increase by signing this contract. Hence, any 
gains from trade increase due to A q ^  will accrue to j, not to 
i. Thus Aq^-^0 cannot help when j dictates to i (and it 
costs in the spot market).
Fourth, if i anticipates dictating terms to j, the re­
sulting price and futures position will both be altered, and j's 
payoff will not be affected. However, the net shcrr position equa­
tions and the qi:L equations below already incorporate maximizing 
gains from trade between i and j, and with this maximizing the 
gains from i dictating terms to j. Thus, here Aq;i^0 cannot 
gain in the futures market, and loses in the cash market.
The conclusion is that the t=l extraction equilibrium equa­




























































































in t=l between each pair of players, also apply to any subgame- 
perfect equilibrium, whether trading is in t=l or not.
Equilibrium extraction for t=l is obtained by maximixing
qilPl(qil+qjl> + qi2P2<qi2+qj2> + <qi3_Ni> P3(qi3+qj3) (10>
for i=A,3 subject to constraint (1). Although q^2 and q^^ 
here are just plans, subject to change in t=2, they are in fact 
not changed in subgame-perfect equilibrium. Note also that N^ is 
the expected net short position at the end cf t=2. Simultaneously 
satisfying first-order conditions requires
Si0
qil qi 2 3
2N.
" H T *
N . 
9 (11a)
si0 + 4Ni 





value of q ^  into equations (4) gives
4.2. The futures market in t=l
We finally consider steps 2 to 5 of the game, during which
the t=l futures market is open.
To determine the payoffs, we must substitute in the results 
of t=l and t=2 extraction activity as defined in equations (11). 
Each payoff function is as viewed by the relevant player at step 
2. (In particular, on average he expects not to have to update his 
own belief about a, and expects the others to update their 
beliefs.) While Wg remains as defined in (6c), and V^, 
which appear in (6a) and (6b), have to be reduced to take account 
of the risk of trading before a+y^ is revealed. Hence




























































































V0 = V - D Vb 2 (fbs + fa J (12b)
where is again a futures position evaluated as of the close
of the t=l futures market and the values of qal and q^, given 
in (11a) are used. Thus, if A is considering whether to trade in 
t=l or wait until the t=2 futures market opens, he considers how 
much hedgeable stock he expects to have when c=2 starts. The new 
risk-reduction terms in (12a) and (12b) reflect the fact that 
prices in t=2 futures will be higher if 10=3+7, is higher.
Ignoring risk premia, additional gains from trading in t=l 
over trading in t=2 are
I fijI (-^-7) |p “ “ P®| > 0 , (13)
l+5
where p^ is i's expectation of p when no observation on to, 
that is, on t=l demand, is available yet.
However, both A and B expect to be compensated for the 
risk of trading before to is revealed. What prices are they wil­




































































































































In these equations, p^j is the price that will result if trade 
happens in t=2 (from the relevant equation in (8) above). The cap­
ital subscript again indicates the player to whom acceptability 
applies. (Since there is the possibility of trading in t=2, con­
straints reflecting the option of foregoing futures activity such 
as (9) are never binding at this step of the game.)
The interpretation of equations (14) is facilitated if we 
refer to Figure 1. It illustrates (14a) and (14b) for the case 
where A dictates to and sells to a more optimistic B (so that 
fab>0)- The upper triangle in Figure 1 contains the set of 
contracts that would be mutually acceptable in t=l if B's 
beliefs were used to forecast the t=l spot market price. (Thus, 
the upward-sloping line that forms the base of the upper triangle 
is a strange hybrid, giving minimally acceptable prices for A 
under the assumption, which A would not accept, that B's 
forecast of period 1 spot prices is unbiased.) The lower triangle, 
an exact translation, contains the set of contracts that would be 
mutually acceptable if p^ were forecast in accordance with A's 
beliefs. The vertical line at position f.^ is halfway across 
both triangles, and contains the contract curve.




which corresponds to 
2
1+5
Point Z represents the maximum price acceptable to (buyer) B 
if risk aversion is ignored, that is. Ell (p_w) - Point Y is the 
average price which A expects he can attain in t=2, namely 
E^(pab)- I!16 expressions after the plus sign in equations (14a) 
and (14b) give the vertical distances between points Y and R 


























































































































































































Both players realize that higher observations of the spot 
price p-ĵ will lead to higher prices in the t=2 futures market, 
and inversely for lower observations (cf. (8)). Thus, relative to 
the average expectations encoded in Z and Y, higher p^ 
observations will lead to gains for a seller of t=2 futures, lower 
P1 ' s to a loss for a t = 2 futures seller, relative to his 
expectation (vice versa for a buyer). As a producer is risk- 
averse, these gains are evaluated at a lower marginal utility of 
incremental payoff than the losses are evaluated. Thus, a better 
price, Q rather than Z for B, R rather than Y for A, is 
required for a producer to be willing to accept the risk of 
signing futures contracts before p^ is revealed.
It must be commonly understood that the pa^ in (14a) and 
(14b) refers to the price that A will dictate to B in t=2 if 
no trading occurs in t=l (with nonetheless different expectations 
of this commonly understood price). Then Q>R corresponds to the 
possibility of simultaneously satisfying (14a) and (I4b), and A 
announces Q in step 2 (t=l), with B accepting; after which no 
trade takes place in t=2. Q=R corresponds to the case of 
precisely one common solution to (14a) and (14b); in this event, 
A announces Q in step 2, and B is indifferent between 
accepting and waiting until period 2 to trade. (However, trading 
between A and B in both periods is still not equilibrium 
behavior.) The case where Q<R, then, corresponds to 
inconsistency of (14a) and (14b); in this event, A is careful to 
announce an offer above the upper triangle (which B rejects), so 
that A saves gains from exchange for t=2.
Notice that the heights ZQ and RY depend upon risk 
aversion but not directly upon differences in beliefs. The height 
ZY depends upon differences in beliefs but not at all upon risk 
aversion. So whenever risk aversion is sufficiently small relative
9. This is the one case of indifference which would not be 
resolved by the introduction of a smallest money unit. In a 





























































































to differences in beliefs, trading occurs exclusively in :he t-1
, . . . 10 futures market.
Let us briefly reintroduce the speculator. A diagram
corresponding to Figure 1 for the case where A dictates to and 
sells to a more optimistic S has Q rising to coincide with Z 
(as S is risk-neutral), so all trade occurs in t=l whenever 
R<Z. If S dictates to and sells to a more optimistic B, R
coincides with Y. Two risk-neutral players always transact only 
in t=l.
It is possible to have (14c) and {14d) consistent, (14e) and 
(14c) consistent, and (14a) and (14b) inconsistent (or similar 
pairings). Then A and B each trade with S only in t=l, but 
with each other only in t=2.
5. Characteristics of subgame-perfect equilibria
5.1. Spot prices and thin markets
Having finished looking backwards, we can look forwards. In 
subgame-perfect equilibrium, regardless of the extent of activity 
in the first-period futures market, expected spot prices progress 
as follows:
px = p + 293 ‘Na + V (15a)
29p2 = p + 3 <Na + Nb ) (15b)
* 49p3 = p - 3 <Na + Nb) . (15c)
In our model, oligopolistic manipulation thus proceeds in the fol­
lowing way. If producers have taken a net short position over t=l
Sufficiently strongly held beliefs - small 5 - also makes 





























































































and t=2, they have substituted known futures prices for uncertain 
spot market prices, and are willing to let the futures price be 
low at maturity. For that purpose, they make sure the spot price 
is low at maturity, since at t=3 futures and spot prices have to 
be equal. Their equilibrium extraction policy is then to extract 
less in t=l and t=2 and to extract more in t=3. As a result, the 
spot price will be higher than in the absence of manipulation 
(i.e., than p) in t=l and t=2, and lower in t=3. If producers 
have accumulated a net long position, they will do the reverse and 
the spot price will decrease relatively more in the beginning of 
the life of a contract and increase relatively more at the end.
The empirical inference is that detrended spot prices in 
thin markets are likely to exhibit more volatility, whether 
producers are going long or short, than when no producers with 
market power in spot markets are active in futures markets. 
Oligopolistic manipulation, of the type analyzed here, is likely 
to occur in thin futures markets in which it is possible to 
surmise the identity of participants in many transactions. The 
crude oil futures contract at the London International Petroleum 
Exchange (IPE) might be a case in point, as suggested by the 
following quotation from the Oil Buyers Guide of 5 September 1988:
"Though prices are called out on the exchange, experts say 
that the IPE Brent is functioning more like a formalized 
cash brokerage system than a dynamic NY-style futures mark­
et. The lack of "locals" on the floor means that most bids 
or offerings will not elicit .the instant open-market re­
sponse typical of the Nymex.1 In this slower moving envir­
onment it is often possible for observers to surmise the 
identity of participants in many transactions."
5.2. Manipulation and closing out contracts
For arbitrary choices of beliefs, stocks, and demand 
responsiveness, there are nontrivial ranges of the parameters 
governing risk aversion (K^, K.q) for which the speculator signs 
futures contracts in t=l. No fruitful opportunity to manipulate




























































































the t=2 futures market is available to producers {of. Section 
4.1). Thus the speculator has an opportunity in the model to 
engage in "canceling" futures transactions, which would 
effectively close out his futures position before the manipulation 
by producers, that he is aware will happen at maturity.
At the prices satisfying equations (14), the opportunity to 
obtain positions in t=l which are then closed out prior to 
maturity is viewed by any one of the three players (due to 
differences in opinion) as an opportunity with expected positive 
profit.
The speculator knowingly and wilfully does not (in
equilibrium) close out positions prior to maturity, aware that 
manipulation is coming. In fact, if both Kg and are
sufficiently small, the speculator does not trade at all in
12equilibrium m  t=2, leaving both contracts open to maturity. 
Positions are not closed out for the simple reason that perceived
gains from trade remain in positions kept open to maturity. 3y
predicting the extent of manipulation that would result from 
signing a contract (via (4)), the speculator can determine what 
futures price will induce him to keep open positions (cf. (8)).
An even more striking rational tolerance for being
manipulated arises in the equilibrium described above. For a 
variety of parameters, in some commitment orders, the speculator 
is able to dictate terms to a producer who requires a sufficiently 
large risk premium that the relevant equations in (14) have no
common solution. When this happens, the speculator is choosing to
forego a short-term unmanipulable profit that he fully expects to 
be positive, in order to improve the terms of trade he can 12
12. For parameter classes with ps much larger than p , p.Q, Ka 
sizeable, small, saQ small, s^g larger, S may buy
futures from B in period 1, and then go on to take a 
longer position by buying from A (at a higher or a lower 




























































































dictate. Then this short-term profit is rationally foregone, and 
the only trade the speculator makes with this producer is a "last- 
minute" position held open to maturity. Only substantial 
notational complexity would be added by extending the 
characterization of open positions at maturity to a model with 
several speculators.
When gains from trade are available, there is nothing 
necessarily irrational about deliberately exposing oneself to 
manipulation. For some readers, inconsistent incomplete 
information would appear to leave too wide a breach open to be a 
first choice for modelling markets. But the alternative is surely 
less palatable: a model with consistent prior beliefs and 
informational bases for rational trading responds to the slightest 
transaction cost by uniquely predicting a zero volume of futures 
market activity (Kreps (1977), Milgrom and Stokey (1982)). The 
predictions of significant activity arising from this model are 
robust to small commissions on trades.
5.3. The law of one price and the informational content of futures 
prices
Significant violence is done to the data from a single 
trading day on the IPE, the Nymex, the London Metal Exchange or 
the Chicago Board of Trade by pretending that a Law of One Price 
applies. In contrast, our model predicts that different trading 
pairs simultaneously transact futures contracts at different 
prices. The question of whether "the" futures price is an unbiased 
predictor of the spot price to arise at maturity cannot even be 
well-posed in such a model. Nor is it a question of any concern: 
traders who transact futures contracts solely on the basis of 
differences in opinion are not looking to futures prices to 
aggregate any information.
Notice that multiple simultaneous prices is in the interest 
of the traders. Averaging across commitment orders, all traders 




























































































all futures contracts in a given period had to occur at a single 
price.
5.4. On the distribution of gains from trading, and take-it-or- 
leave-it contracts
Interestingly, a producer in a concentrated resource 
extraction industry can benefit from the existence of a futures 
market even if he does not take part: if A opts out by setting 
fab=fas=0, his payoff still includes a positive quadratic term in 
f^g (see (6)]. This is because another producer active in the 
futures market will predictably manipulate the spot market by 
shifting extraction into or out of the maturity date. A producer 
who opts out rationally responds by shifting some of his resource 
extraction in the opposite direction, to a higher-priced spot 
market (see (4)).
As the counter-shift just described is optimally a smaller 
shift, some of the benefit is passed on to final derr.anders: in 
aggregate, producers shift extraction from a spot market with a 
higher present price to a lower-priced spot market. Because of 
this feature, the full game among the two producers and the 
speculator will be ex post negative sum, but it is ex ante viewed 
as positive sum, inconsistently, by all three.
In the equilibrium described above, any futures contract 
signed distributes all but a minimal share of gains from exchange 
to one party. This is clearly due to the simplification of 
requiring take-it-or-leave-it contracts. "Open outcry" markets 
typically operate under an alternative in which, if an offer to 
sell 200 contracts at 45 has standing, it is allowable to accept 
partially, e.g., to cry "I'll take 100 of that". This alternative 
is analyzed in a model where the futures market is open only once 
(Harstad and Phlips (1990)); it proves much more complicated than 
take-it-or-leave-it contracts. Without introducing all the 
complications, some of the changes that would result if this 




























































































this paper are clear.13 Some features are also clearly robust with 
respect to this aspect of the trading rules.
Partial acceptance rules would yield an equilibrium in which 
the commitment order would allow one player in a trading pair to 
dictate the price at which they trade, with the other determining 
the quantity. The contract-by-contract distribution of the gains 
from trade would then be less one-sided. The same contract-by- 
contract temporary monopoly aspect would also lead to reduced 
positions on contracts, and an overall sub-optimal volume of 
futures market opportunity, in contrast to take-it-or-leave-it 
contracts.
The general pattern of timing of futures activity found 
above is robust to this sort of change in the trading rules. To 
wit, under partial acceptance rules, larger gains from trade would 
be available in the first futures market than in the second; 
surely only substantial levels of risk aversion would prevent an 
emphasis upon futures trading in t=l. Necessarily, however, gains 
from trade will remain when the t=2 futures market opens. It may 
be possible to see further trading in t=2 even when all trading 
pairs reached agreement in t=l, but this possibility will have 
been foreseen and may have been foreclosed; only a complete and 
extremely complex analysis can tell.
A major conclusion can be proven robust to this change. If 
he signs contracts in t=l, the speculator will have the 
opportunity to close out positions in t=2, but he will choose not 
to do so. Any positions satisfying (14d), (14f) are positions that 
S will prefer to hold open, and the additional options he has 
with more flexible trading rules do not change this preference.
13. Harstad and Phlips (1990) also change the game by having the 
commitment order revealed after offers are announced. The 




























































































6. Insights into futures markets with simultaneous trading of 
multiple maturities
To avoid the prediction of an inactive futures market, we 
have based evaluation of potential trades on inconsistent beliefs. 
"Opening the door" in this fashion has not served to obtain 
arbitrary behavior. A specific pattern emerges in subgame-perfect 
equilibrium which accords acceptably with some stylized facts of 
markets: Early futures contracting arises when risk aversion is 
not too severe; The speculator does not close out positions prior 
to maturity.
Emphasis on these results points to the simplification of a 
single maturity date as a key limitation of the analysis. Existing 
futures markets involve simultaneous trading of futures contracts 
for multiple maturity dates. We close by indicating the sort of 
generalization which seems likely.
Consider a repeated game in which "stage games" having the 
form outlined in Section 1 recur in an overlapping fashion, 
perhaps with stage T proceeding through steps 2-5 while stage T-l 
proceeds through steps 8-11 and stage T-2 reaches maturity. 
Technical complications presented by such a game are chilling. Two 
principal complications merit discussion here. First, the repeated 
game aspects create the possibility of a plethora of qualitatively 
different equilibria supported by history-dependent strategies. 
For this discussion, we limit attention to subgame-perfect 
equilibria in strategies that depend upon history only through 
current state variables.
Second, with the sort of Bayesian updating incorporated 
here, infinitely lived players would come to have nearly identical 
beliefs, as accumulated information overwhelmed any inconsistency 
in priors. This would lead to a prediction of vanishing futures 
market speculation over time.
Adjustments of the following sort could overcome this 




























































































lived, with overlapping generations stepping into the roles of 
producers and speculators. Suppose further that a newly arriving 
role player shows up, perhaps at a random time, with an ad hoc 
inconsistent prior belief, in no way influenced by the 
observations of spot prices during his predecessor's lifetime.14 15
Then continued speculative trading based upon nonvanishing belief 
inconsistencies would be possible.
The analysis presented in this paper clearly suggests a 
carryover of key aspects to such a repeated game model. Whenever 
inconsistent beliefs are present, a "rush to trade" may 
continually be observed, as beliefs are known to become less 
disparate with new information (which could be interpreted more 
broadly than just spot market clearing prices), and gains from 
trade are known to diminish correspondingly. Thus, futures market 
volume and volatility in excess of that justified by underlying 
fundamentals may be explicable.
Moreover, equilibria involving a willingness on a 
speculator's part to hold open positions to maturity seem in no 
way to depend on a single maturity date. The gains from trade 
which encouraged opening the position early remain, and the 
manipulation which could repeatedly occur at maturity dates need 
not prevent market functioning. Speculators would simply 
anticipate the appropriate terms in which to share in the gains 
from trade on positions open to maturity.
14. An alternative scenario would be to have each player employ 
an ad hoc test of his current beliefs, and discard them in 
favor of another ad hoc inconsistent prior whenever the 
extent of updating failed the test.
15. An observed tendency for the aggregate volume of open 
positions to fall sharply shortly before maturity dates does 
not seem incompatible with this story. Perceived gains from 
trade are more substantial further from maturity, so near 
maturity, a switch by speculators to futures contracts with 
later maturity dates (including dates for which no market 
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